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Foreign  
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# Politics in Syria

**An Intelligence Assessment**

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## An Intelligence Assessment

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Politics in Syria



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**Key Points**


President Assad's cautious, calculating personality dominates the Syrian decisionmaking process. He is extremely patient and tolerant of ambiguity.

Assad's key lieutenants are the Alawite commanders of Syria's military and intelligence services, not the formal cabinet or Baath Party leadership.

Syria will not accept a peace agreement unless Israel promises to return the Golan area and satisfies most Palestinian aspirations.

Assad's diplomatic strategy recognizes Syrian weakness and is based on securing widespread Arab and international support for his objectives.

Information on the political process in Syria is extremely limited because of the closed nature of Syrian society. As a result much of the analysis in this paper is speculative. We have attempted nonetheless to identify some of the key power brokers and to describe their objectives, constituencies, and style of operation.



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## Politics in Syria

### Assad's Dominant Role

President Hafiz Assad dominates the decisionmaking process in Syria. He has ruled the country longer than anyone else since independence was achieved in 1946 by erecting a relatively stable power structure based on the support of his fellow Alawite military officers, members of a Muslim minority sect that comprises about 13 percent of Syria's population.\*

Assad makes all the important decisions himself, especially in defense and foreign affairs. For example, Assad oversees all officer promotions, assignments, training, and travel. He has developed an intricate system of checks and balances to maintain his hold on power. None of his subordinates is allowed too much power, and each is used against the others by Assad.

Assad's personality strongly influences Syrian decisionmaking. He is an extremely cautious man who prefers to take incremental steps rather than dramatic initiatives. He eschews radical actions and philosophies, preferring pragmatic, moderate policies. Assad strongly objected to the strident radicalism of his predecessor, Salah Jadid, who led Syria into two defeats, with Israel in 1967 and in Jordan in 1970. Assad, in contrast, has sought to project an image of respectability for Syria. Even as a coup plotter, Assad was cautious. He could have removed Jadid early in 1970, but he waited until November of that year to ensure that his coup would be relatively bloodless and smooth. Assad can take dramatic initiatives, such as his decision to take part in the 1973 war with Israel, but even then Syria's offensive was carefully planned and prepared in advance and would not have been undertaken if Egypt had not taken the lead.

Assad also has a remarkable tolerance for uncertainty. He is quite willing to allow an ambiguous situation to continue when others impatiently demand a resolution of the problem. Moreover, Assad is willing to reverse

\* The Alawites are treated in more detail in appendix A.




*Patient, cautious President Hafiz Assad, supported by fellow Alawite military officers, has dominated Syria's decisionmaking longer than anyone else since Syria became independent in 1946.*

direction and retreat from an undesirable position without apology or hesitation if the situation demands.

Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war aptly illustrates Assad's decisionmaking style. He moved his forces into Lebanon slowly and patiently, carefully judging each step to reduce the risk of disaster. He was willing to switch sides midway through the war and fight Syria's traditional ally, the Palestinians, when he

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Syrian troops in Lebanon.

judged that Syrian interests were better served. Since early 1978 he has moved cautiously to whittle down the power of Israel's Maronite Christian allies, always pulling back from confrontation when Tel Aviv threatens to intervene. [REDACTED]

Assad is a quiet, private man who puts in a long working day. He is usually unemotional, preferring to let his Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam make the fiery speeches while he remains silent. Unlike Egypt's Sadat, Assad grants few interviews and keeps his own counsel. [REDACTED]

#### Assad's Key Lieutenants

Syria's formal cabinet has little role in policymaking. Prime Minister Muhammad Halabi and Defense

Minister Mustapha Talas are figureheads with no political power base who hold office primarily to appease the Sunni majority. Foreign Minister Khaddam, as noted, is a vocal and often passionate spokesman for Assad's foreign policy but has no power base within the country. Syrian Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi and Interior Minister Adnan Dabbagh are trusted and able technocrats who only carry out Assad's policies. [REDACTED]

Assad relies for support on a small group of military and intelligence officers—almost all Alawites—who are extremely loyal to the President and are characterized by their discretion and secretive nature. This informal group is known in Syria as the Jamaa or "the company." [REDACTED]

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Rifaat Assad, [redacted] key adviser to brother Hafiz Assad, controls the intelligence network that guards the Assad family's hold on power. (c)

Assad's younger brother *Rifaat* is a key adviser to the President and a major figure in ensuring the regime's survival. Rifaat commands the 20,000-member Defense Companies, an Alawite-dominated elite force based primarily in Damascus. Rifaat is thus well placed to influence events in the capital. He also controls an extensive intelligence network that permeates Syrian society to guard the Assad family's hold on power. [redacted]

In the last year Rifaat has succeeded in improving his power base in Syria. In March 1978 he helped engineer the downfall of his longtime rival, Air Force Commander Naji Jamil, and replaced him with a Rifaat loyalist, Subhi Haddad. Rifaat also helped place his friend Muhammad Halabi as Prime Minister, removing General Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi, who had

criticized Rifaat for corruption. In July, Rifaat benefited from a major shakeup in the Army high command that placed many of his Alawite allies in key positions. Rifaat also seems to have improved his position in the Baath Party and will probably strengthen his position in the coming party elections.

Despite this formidable power base, Rifaat has many enemies. To Syrian Sunnis, he is the symbol of Alawite arrogance and abuse of power. There is no question of his involvement in corrupt activities. Rifaat has powerful enemies in the Alawite community. Many Alawite officers regard Rifaat as the President's bodyguard, *not* his heir, and might be willing to move against him if he tries to lay claim to the presidency.

[redacted] Units of the Defense Companies under his command in Lebanon have committed some of the most reprehensible abuses of Syria's peacekeeping role in that country, including the massacre of 30 civilians in June 1978 in the Bekaa Valley and perhaps the assassination of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. At home Rifaat is hated by many for the heavyhanded tactics of his men. [redacted]

Air Force Intelligence Chief *Muhammad Khuli* enjoys a very close and trusting relationship with Assad—he is the President's security adviser, has been an emissary in Lebanon, is from the same village, and is an Alawite. He often performs special projects for Assad and is said to be efficient, hardworking, self-assured, and very ambitious. His subordinates claim Khuli is the number-two man in Syria. [redacted]

Khuli has a strong power base in Air Force Intelligence. Moreover, he is related by marriage to Alawite Air Force Chief of Staff Ibrahim Hasan. [redacted]

A major power broker is military intelligence chief *Ali Duba*. Duba's intelligence apparatus—primarily Alawite and Baathi in composition—maintains a close watch for signs of dissidence in the Army. Ali Duba has adopted a low profile [redacted]

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Muhammad Khuli, efficient, hardworking, and ambitious, has a strong power base in Air Force intelligence. [redacted]

is the first Syrian leader to have Israeli newspapers translated for his use as a source of information on the enemy, and he consults with Syrian foreign policy experts outside of the government. [redacted]

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The one thing that unites all these Alawites is their goal of keeping the Assad regime in power and the Alawites dominant in Syria. Many have been extremely suspicious of Assad's efforts to improve relations with Iraq, which is dominated by Sunni Muslims. Rifaat is said to be particularly opposed to any substantive unity moves between the two Baathi regimes for fear this would weaken Alawite control and thus endanger his own position in Syria. [redacted]

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#### Key Constituencies

The Syrians historically have been a badly divided community. Religious differences, regional rivalries, and the conflicting ties of Syrian versus pan-Arab nationalism produced almost a dozen coups between 1948 and 1970. [redacted]

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Assad's power base is centered on the Alawite military officers who control the armed forces. The military has been the determinant in Syrian politics since the 1948 Arab defeat by Israel. The Alawites, traditionally impoverished farmers with little political power, were attracted in large numbers to the military in the 1950s as a means of self-advancement. With the Sunni officer corps decimated by coups and purges in the 1950s and 1960s, the relatively cohesive Alawites gained power. [redacted]

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Assad has appointed Alawites to key command posts in the military—the armored brigades, air defense command, elite commandos, and paratroopers—and placed others in positions to monitor the military intelligence services and diplomatic service. [redacted]

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Special Forces commander *Ali Haydar*, another Alawite, commands the elite paratrooper and commando units of the Army. Many are currently in Lebanon, a factor that may have reduced Haydar's influence in Damascus, where they are usually stationed as a counterweight to Rifaat's Defense Companies. Assad's nephew *Adnan* commands a third Praetorian guard force, the Struggle Companies, also stationed in Damascus. [redacted]

Assad's immediate staff has no policymaking powers but does have some influence on implementation. An important personality is Presidential Adviser *Adib Daudi*, also an Alawite. Daudi often acts as Assad's spokesman on foreign affairs and conducts key foreign trips, such as his last minute trip to Saudi Arabia just before the second Baghdad conference. He also functions as Assad's chief of staff, overseeing his appointments and preparing his briefing papers. Assad values a careful presentation of the pros and cons of issues. He



Most of these Alawite officers are intensely loyal to Assad and their sect. They fear the consequences of sectarian violence if Assad were removed. There are, however, divisions within the sect—tribal and ideological—that Assad must minimize to stay in power. Assad has carefully assuaged Alawite concerns to keep their favor. [REDACTED]

destroying their state, and this affects their decisionmaking. They continue to suspect, for example, that the Lebanese civil war was the result of an American-Israeli-Egyptian conspiracy to weaken Syria's opposition to Sinai II. [REDACTED]

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#### Opposition Groups

Assad also has been careful to expand his power base to include other minority groups and the Sunni majority. As noted, Sunnis are prominent, although mostly powerless, in the cabinet. Assad also constantly reiterates his commitment to basic Islamic beliefs to emphasize the Sunni's and Alawites' common Muslim identity. Nonetheless, the Sunni urban elite has little affection for the Assad government and has on occasion demonstrated its opposition by encouraging religious rioting. [REDACTED]

Assad's most dangerous potential opposition comes from within his own Alawite community. Since the Alawites form the backbone of Assad's hold on power, a serious factional split within the community could threaten him. We know of two groups of Alawites who have been unhappy with Assad in the past and who might try to move against him if the conditions were opportune. [REDACTED]

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Syria's ruling Baath Party, which dominates the coalition National Progressive Front, has only a nominal voice in Syrian decisionmaking.\* Assad uses the party for patronage and as a means to mobilize mass support, but he is careful to lead rather than be led by it. The Baath is generally more rigid than Assad, and it acts as a constraint in the Arab-Israeli dispute. [REDACTED]

Supporters of Assad's predecessor and fellow Alawite Salah Jadid (now imprisoned in Damascus) have tried to restore Jadid to power on at least two occasions since 1970—in November 1972 and December 1976. Assad has repeatedly purged the officer corps of Jadidists, but some secret sympathizers undoubtedly remain. Jadid probably also has supporters within the Baath, particularly among the extreme left. [REDACTED]

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#### The Syrian Style

As in most societies, the Syrian ruling elite tends to see the world through the lenses of its own historical experience. Repeated coups, countercoups, and plots since 1949 have scarred the Syrian political psyche with a tradition of conspiratorial politics. [REDACTED]

Jadid's years in power—1966 to 1970—were marked by a strong attachment to pan-Arabist and leftist ideology. Syria was very close to the USSR and pursued a policy of total rejection of peace with Israel. If Jadid or his supporters returned to power, we would expect a return to these policies. [REDACTED]

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The net result has been to encourage Syrians to perceive events around them in conspiratorial terms. This perception can go to extremes on occasion. Syrians often view developments they cannot understand as plots hatched by their enemies aimed at

The second group of Alawites unhappy with Assad are supporters of former Defense Minister Muhammad Umran—one of Assad's rivals in the 1960s who was assassinated in 1972 [REDACTED] while in exile in Lebanon. We do not know of any attempts by Umranists to oust Assad. The Umran faction has participated as a junior partner in ruling Syria since 1972. [REDACTED]

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\* The Baath Party is treated in more detail in appendix B.

The Umran faction has maneuvered cautiously in the past to disassociate itself from unpopular policies without actually breaking with Assad. They have consistently refused to cooperate with the Jadidists—a division that obviously benefits Assad. [REDACTED]

We are not aware of any significant anti-Assad Sunni cabals in the officer corps, although some kind of Sunni-organized opposition cannot be ruled out. The Sunnis are probably deeply divided over what kind of regime they would like to see if Assad could be ousted. [REDACTED]

Syria has been plagued since mid-1976 by a series of assassinations of prominent Alawites. More than a dozen people—including one of Assad's nephews—have been killed. Most of the assassinations reportedly have been the work of the extremist Sunni group known as the Youth of Muhammad or the Lions of Muhammad. The Youth of Muhammad first appeared in 1973 in Hamah, long a Sunni stronghold. Its founder was Shaykh Mirwan Hadid, an influential, conservative Sunni religious leader and a longtime opponent of the ruling Baath Party and of Alawite primacy in Syria. In early 1973 he was one of the instigators of Sunni rioting in Hamah and Hims against a new constitution that failed to prescribe Islam as the religion of the president. [REDACTED]

Hadid formed the Youth of Muhammad shortly thereafter, attracting disaffected Sunni intellectuals and youths. In July 1975 there were several clashes between Hadid's followers and Alawites in Hamah. In early 1976 a senior security official was killed in Hamah, apparently by the Youth of Muhammad. Hadid was arrested and imprisoned. After a 65-day fast he died on 19 July. His followers believe he was murdered. The regime refused to allow Hadid's family to bury him in Hamah in order to avoid further incidents, but his death was announced from minarets in Hamah and Hims. [REDACTED]

Following Hadid's death, the Youth of Muhammad resolved to assassinate leading Alawites, especially relatives of Assad, to get their revenge and destabilize the regime. Rumors circulating in Damascus claim 110 Alawites have been listed for execution. While the

Youth of Muhammad by itself does not pose a threat to the regime's survival, it is a major reflection of Sunni discontent. Perhaps the greatest danger from the group is the possibility it might assassinate Assad. [REDACTED]

The Youth of Muhammad have been tied to Iraq in the past and may still retain some links to Baghdad despite the rapprochement between the two Baathi rivals. The group probably also has links to other Sunni groups in Syria including the Muslim Brotherhood. [REDACTED]

One faction of the Communist Party is legal in Syria and participates in the ruling National Progressive Front. Led by one of the first Arab Communists, Khalid Bakdash, the party is few in numbers and has little influence with Assad. Its fortunes rise and fall with Damascus' relationship with Moscow. Several small anti-Soviet Communist parties operate underground but appear to be fairly well controlled and supervised by the regime. [REDACTED]

#### Syria and the Peace Process

Assad continues to adhere to his own hardline approach to a Middle East settlement. The Syrians are convinced that Sadat's actions have led the Middle East away from a peace settlement and toward another war. In Damascus' view Sadat's direct talks with Israel divided the Arab world and thereby eroded its ability to use diplomatic and military pressure to secure concessions from Israel. Syria argues that Sadat's approach has encouraged Israel to be more intransigent than ever. Moreover, Damascus believes Egypt's face-to-face talks with Tel Aviv conceded one of the Arabs' most significant bargaining cards—recognition of Israel's right to exist. [REDACTED]

Even before Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, Assad differed with Sadat on basic strategy, believing that the Arabs should try to strike a balance between the United States and the USSR to maximize opportunities for maneuver and to maintain a credible military threat to Israel. Although Assad shares Sadat's conviction that the United States holds the key to a negotiated settlement, he believes Sadat has been unwise to tie



President Assad meeting  
President Brezhnev in Moscow,  
October 1978.

There is very little room for maneuver in the Syrian formulation. [REDACTED]

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The Syrians are adamant about recovering all of the Golan Heights. They are unwilling to negotiate any modifications in the 1949 armistice lines, and they demand the removal of all Israeli settlements from the Heights. [REDACTED]

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There are several elements that could complicate the border issue. The international border originally drawn between Syria and the Palestine mandate is in dispute in a few areas, particularly in the north where Israel, Syria, and Lebanon border. Moreover, the 1949 armistice accord established three small demilitarized zones in Mandate Palestine along the border in areas occupied by Syrian troops at the end of the war. Conceivably some minor adjustments might be made in these areas. The territory involved is very small, however, and would not satisfy Israeli demands for defensible positions on the Golan Heights. [REDACTED]

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Egypt so closely to the US and to end close ties with Moscow. Assad and Sadat also have strikingly divergent personality styles. Sadat loves the bold and innovative move that attracts world attention. Assad, on the other hand, is pragmatic and cautious and cares little for theatrical gestures. [REDACTED]

In exchange for an Israeli pullback the Syrians have said they will accept limited demilitarization of the Golan as long as an equal portion of the Israeli border region is also demilitarized. Syria would also accept UN peacekeeping forces. Assad is probably willing to discuss the timing and phasing of a withdrawal as long as the principle of a restoration of Syrian sovereignty is acknowledged by Tel Aviv. [REDACTED]

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Despite Syria's opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement Syria remains committed in principle to a peace agreement with Israel. Syria's terms for a settlement, however, are the toughest of any of the Arab confrontation states. [REDACTED]

#### The Palestinian Issue

The Golan, however, is not the only issue in Syrian eyes. For Syria, as Assad told an interviewer in 1977, "Golan is peripheral, Sinai too. The Palestinian problem is the gut issue." Damascus' attachment to the Palestinian cause should not be underestimated. Assad probably cannot accept a peace settlement that does not address the issue. [REDACTED]

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The standard Syrian terms were summed up by Assad in an interview with the BBC in 1975.

We feel the termination of the state of war requires the achievement of two things: first, Israel's withdrawal from all the territories it occupied in 1967; the second, the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

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In part, adherence to the Palestinian cause reflects the Syrians' support for what they see as a just cause—reinforced by years of propaganda. Domestic politics also play a role. Syria has almost 300,000 Palestinian refugees—a significant political force in a nation of 7 million. Moreover, the 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon are an important concern to Assad, given his belief that Lebanon's stability is essential to Syrian security. Syria simply cannot ignore the interests of the Palestinians, nor does it want to. [redacted]

was quoted on Radio Damascus as agreeing—in an interview with the *New York Times*—to “signing a peace treaty.” In Syrian eyes this acceptance of Israel is a tremendous concession, albeit a grudging one. [redacted]

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Assad rejects the concept of normalizing relations with Israel as being part of a settlement. He argues that such matters as diplomatic recognition and trade are not legitimate subjects for peace negotiations. Ideally he would like to sign an accord terminating belligerence and then ignore Israel completely. [redacted]

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Assad has never been willing to state explicitly his ideas on how to solve the Palestinian problem. “Neither Damascus nor Cairo can decide about Palestine,” he argues. “Only the Palestinian people can do this.” Assad has, nonetheless, endorsed the concept of a West Bank–Gaza Palestinian state provided the arrangement satisfies a majority of the Palestinians. He has said that he would also accept a political link between the West Bank and Jordan if they both want it. [redacted]

He probably is pragmatic enough, however, to understand that he will have to take some steps toward normalization. Assad already has allowed meetings to take place on the Golan Heights between Druze villagers divided by the UN disengagement zone. Damascus probably could accept other measures in a settlement such as an end to the Arab boycott of Israel and of firms that deal with Israel, third country civilian airline direct flights between Syria and Israel, and reciprocal notification of military maneuvers near the common border. Moreover, Assad has left open the possibility of a further normalization of relations after a settlement is reached. [redacted]

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Assad also has insisted that UN resolutions—particularly Resolution 148—that call for the repatriation or compensation of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war be honored as part of a settlement. It is unclear how firm he is in this demand—he probably could accept some vague compensation formula if it satisfied most Palestinians living in the diaspora. [redacted]

#### Negotiating Strategy

Assad's statements on Jerusalem call for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines. Nevertheless, he probably would follow the Saudi lead on this issue. As a member of the minority Alawite Muslim sect Assad would want the blessing of Sunni Riyadh to sell a Jerusalem solution at home. [redacted]

Assad recognizes that by itself Syria is too weak to recover the Golan. Thus his diplomatic strategy is based on securing as much support from as many sources as possible for Syrian objectives. Unlike Sadat, Assad has carefully maintained his ties with Moscow. He has moved to develop close ties with Jordan, the Palestinians, and Lebanon, and Syria consistently emphasizes the virtues of Arab solidarity. [redacted]

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#### Syrian Concessions

In return for Israeli concessions on the Golan and Palestinian issues, Assad is willing to offer an end to the state of war with Israel and a formal peace treaty, but very little more. Even a peace treaty is a sensitive topic. In 1975 Assad told *Newsweek* that he would sign a formal treaty, but he later retracted the offer, apparently under pressure at home from militants within the ruling Baath Party. In 1977, however, he

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The Syrian President believes that he must increase Israel's incentives for making unpalatable concessions. He believes it is necessary that Syria develop a credible military threat by upgrading its weaponry and by seeking closer ties with its archrival, Iraq. He also wants both great powers to be involved in negotiations, strong US pressure on Israel, and a negotiating framework that confronts the Israelis with the choice of a comprehensive agreement or nothing. [REDACTED]


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Assad believes the form of negotiations is at least as important as the substance. He wants to be able to exploit Israel's desire for peace with Egypt and Jordan in order to extract concessions on the Syrian and the Palestinian issues. His opposition to the Camp David accords has the same foundation: he perceived them as providing a framework for separate negotiations. [REDACTED]

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Assad is not eagerly waiting in the wings to join the negotiating process, and he is unlikely to enter it unless he comes to believe that Israel is eager for peace with Syria and willing to pay a substantial price. [REDACTED]

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## Appendix A

### The Alawites

The Alawites have played a preeminent role in Syrian politics since the mid-1960s despite their comprising only 13 percent of the country's population. Traditionally, the Alawites have been one of Syria's poorest communities, despised by the orthodox majority Sunnis. Many Sunnis do not regard Alawites as true Muslims. [REDACTED]

primarily Alawite controlled, and the Alawites are heavily overrepresented in their composition. The Defense Companies may be as much as 90 percent Alawite. Other minorities such as the Christians and Druze are also heavily overrepresented in the military. [REDACTED]

The Alawite heartland is in the northwestern part of the country in the Nusayri Mountains along the Mediterranean Sea. These mountains have provided the Alawites a refuge for centuries. They are named after the ninth-century founder of the Alawite sect, the Islamic mystic Ibn Nusayr. The Assad family home is in the Nusayri Mountains at Qardaha, although Assad spends much of his time in the port city of Latakia. Alawites are also found in Turkey around the city of Iskenderun and in northern Lebanon. [REDACTED]

The Alawite community contains several tribal confederations. The two largest are the Haddadin and the Khayyat. Jadid comes from the Haddadin and Umrani from the Khayyat. Assad is a member of the smaller Kalbiyah tribe. We suspect these tribal ties play a part in Alawite politics. Kinship and family ties are also influential. [REDACTED]

During the French mandate the Alawite region had a great deal of autonomy; after independence the Alawite political identity declined. During the early 1960s a number of Alawites who had come up through the army and air force, the only channel of upward mobility available, emerged as key figures in the military wing of the Baath Party. Three figures were particularly prominent—Salah Jadid, Hafiz Assad, and Muhammad Umrani. [REDACTED]

Little is known of the internal workings of the Alawite community. Religious values and practices are hidden from outsiders—a common practice in heterodox Islamic sects who adopted this tactic to protect themselves from the Sunnis. The structure and influence of the sect's religious leadership is a well-guarded secret and a mystery both to the outside world and most Syrians. [REDACTED]

These Alawite officers have emphasized rural development and social change since taking power—a reflection of their social background and Baathist ideology. Widespread land reforms have broken the hold of the traditional Sunni landlord and merchant class that dominated Syria before the 1960s. [REDACTED]

Syria's other sects include the majority Sunnis, who are predominant in the urban areas, especially Hims, Hamah, Aleppo, and Damascus, as well as in most of the 13 provinces. Several Christian groups, including Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Maronites, make up about 10 percent of the population. Other heterodox Islamic groups include about 150,000 Druze, located primarily in the As Suwayda region in the south, and a few Shia. Ethnically Syria is 90 percent Arab. There is a Kurdish minority near Al Hasakah in the northeast. [REDACTED]

Today the key units of the military—Rifaat Assad's Defense Companies, Ali Haydar's Special Forces, the armored units, and the Air Force fighting units—are

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## Appendix B

### The Baath Party

The Syrian Baath Party has limited influence today in decisionmaking. That has become the exclusive province of President Assad and his clique of Alawite advisers. The Baath remains an important party of Syrian society, however, and Assad uses it to organize civilian support for his regime and provide a measure of legitimacy for his rule. The pan-Arab ideology of the Baath provides a rallying point for Syrians and tends to diminish Sunni discontent with Assad's Alawite power base. [REDACTED]

The officers who came to dominate the army in the 1960s represented a sharp break with Syria's traditional political leadership. The latter had come from the landlord-merchant class centered in the big cities and were primarily Sunni. The officer corps, in contrast, contained members from minority groups and often stressed rural reform. The minorities were overrepresented because they found the military to be the only path for social and economic advancement during the Sunni domination of political life. [REDACTED]

The Baath officially shares power in Syria with several other parties through the National Progressive Front. The Baath dominates the Front; it provides the chairman of the Front (Assad) and controls eight of the 16 seats on its governing board. Four other parties share the remaining seats—the Communist Party, two Nasirite parties (the Arab Socialist Union and the Socialist Unionists), and the Arab Socialists (followers of Akram Hawrani, a powerful politician of the 1950s). Only the Baath is allowed to conduct political activity in the military. [REDACTED]

Accurate figures on the size of the Baath Party are a well-guarded secret. Most sources estimate it has about 100,000 active members and 200,000 supporters. The basic party unit is the cell; a collection of cells forms a company, two or more companies form a division, and several divisions form a branch. Each of the 13 provinces has a branch, as do the cities of Damascus and Aleppo. There is a separate structure of branches in the military. [REDACTED]

The Baath or Resurrection Party was founded in Syria in the 1940s. Its primary ideological commitment is to Arab unity, but it also espouses the socialization of the economy and secularization of politics. The Baath has from its start had a multiconfessional character. Its founders included an Alawite, Zaki Arsuzi; a Greek Orthodox Christian, Michel Aflaq; and a Sunni, Salah Bitar. [REDACTED]

The party leadership is divided into two commands: a Regional Command responsible for the Syrian "region" of the Arab "nation" and a National Command, which supervises the Baath Party organization throughout the Arab world. Until 1966 there was one Baath National Command; since then there have been competing commands and indeed competing parties centered in Syria and Iraq. President Assad is Secretary General of both the Regional and National Commands. [REDACTED]

The Baath Party became the political instrument of the Syrian military in the 1960s. Originally dominated in Syria by civilians, a group of officers—including Assad—clandestinely founded a Baath military organization separate from the main party apparatus during the period when Syria was united with Nasir's Egypt (1958-61). This small group of officers masterminded a coup on 8 March 1963. These officers took over the party and ousted its founders, including Aflaq and Bitar in February 1966. Assad ousted Jadid from power in November 1970. [REDACTED]

The Syrian Baath Party claims to have an organization in every Arab country and even in several non-Arab states with significant Arab populations. The Syrian Baath actually has very little external appeal or organization. Only in Lebanon does the party have a significant following, led by Assam Qansu. Even there, the Syrian Baath has little influence in Lebanese politics. Qansu is widely and accurately regarded as a Syrian puppet. [REDACTED]



Inside Syria the Baath is extensively organized at the local level to generate popular support for the Assad regime. Syrian youths, for example, are inducted into the Baath Vanguard. This organization was created in 1974, and official statistics released in 1976 claim it has over 300,000 members. It has cells throughout the country and is supposed to instill the Baath ideology in Syrian youth. [REDACTED]

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The Higher Institute for Political Science, located near Damascus, is assigned the task of training party cadres for positions of responsibility in Syria and the external branches. Assad has devoted considerable attention to inducting and training cadres to implement his decisions. [REDACTED]

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The Baath exerts a considerable influence on the Syrian media. The party's journal, *al-Baath*, is one of the three leading newspapers in Damascus. [REDACTED]

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The function of the Baath in Syria today is to educate and organize society politically. Organizing should not be confused with ruling. It is the inner clique of Alawite military and intelligence officials around Assad that rules Syria. [REDACTED]

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Nonetheless Assad and most of his associates are lifelong members of the Baath, and its ideological conceptions help share the Baath world view. The Baath's deep commitment to the Palestinian cause and anti-Zionism is reflected in Assad's perception of Israel and the peace process and acts as a major constraint on Assad. The strong Baathi opposition to the Egyptian peace initiative undoubtedly reinforced Assad's inclination to break with President Sadat after the latter went to Jerusalem. [REDACTED]

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